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Mossoff: Why History Matters in the Patentable Subject Matter Debate

WHY HISTORY MATTERS IN THE PATENTABLE
SUBJECT MATTER DEBATE
Adam Mossoff ∗
In America’s First Patents, 1 Michael Risch proves that nothing beats
the facts when it comes to making or assessing claims about the history
of patentable subject matter doctrine. Of course, one might ask why we
should care about history, especially when justifying or critiquing legal
rules that secure property rights in twenty-first-century innovation in
high-tech computers or biotech. It’s a fair question.
The easy answer is that everyone is doing it. Since the U.S. Supreme
Court resurrected the moribund doctrine of patentable subject matter, 2
historical arguments abound about whether business methods, 3 isolated
DNA, 4 or diagnostic techniques 5 count as patentable inventions or
discoveries, regardless of how novel, useful or nonobvious they may be.
As Professor Risch points out, scholars and judges are now arguing
about the meaning of the basic legal rule in patent law, formulated so
perfectly in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, that “laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable,” 6 and
historical practices are fundamental to their conclusions. 7
But this is not an entirely convincing answer. Just because Justice
John Paul Stevens discovers his inner originalist when it comes to
adjudicating patentable subject matter issues is not a reason by itself for
others to do the same. 8 There are reasons why one should care about
∗ Adam Mossoff, Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law.
1. Michael Risch, America’s First Patents, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1279 (2012).
2. The Court first signaled that it was ready to hear arguments about patentable subject
matter in 2006 when it granted cert in Laboratory Corp. of America v. Metabolite Laboratories,
but then dismissed the writ as being improvidently granted (DIG), see 548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006).
3. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229, 3231 (2010) (holding business methods
are patentable, but invaliding the method on hedging risk in a sale of commodities as an attempt
to patent an abstract idea).
4. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d
1303, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that isolated DNA sequences are patentable discoveries),
cert granted in part U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2012) (No. 12-398).
5. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012)
(invalidating a patent on a medical diagnostic technique as an invalid attempt at patenting a law
of nature).
6. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 185 (1980) (stating that “[e]xcluded from such patent protection are laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas”).
7. There are far too many to cite in a footnote, especially in a short essay, and so a
representative sample will have to suffice. See, e.g., Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3239–46 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 966–76 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Dyk, J., concurring), rev’d,
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After
Bilski: History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 61 (2011). .
8. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3239–46 (Stevens, J., concurring) (invoking the Founders, quoting
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history, though, and Professor Risch’s article nicely articulates them,
albeit some more explicitly than others. In this short essay, I will briefly
discuss two of them.
First, his historical study calls into question many arguments today
about patentable subject matter doctrine. 9 If anything, these arguments
were the reason why he undertook the herculean task of reading and
coding approximately 3,700 patents issued between 1790 and 1839.10
Despite many claims today about long-established historical practices
concerning what inventions were or were not excluded from the patent
system, the actual patents that issued to inventors in the first fifty years
of the American Republic, in Professor Risch’s words, are a “largely
ignored body of information.” 11
As a result of this study of early patents, many historical arguments
about patentable subject matter doctrine drop like flies, including
Justice Stevens’ long-held view that Congress must expressly approve
of patents for new types of inventions or discoveries 12 and the Federal
Circuit’s claim in Bilski that the machine-or-transformation test is
rooted in indisputable historical precedent. 13 Perhaps most important,
the historical legal rule that abstract “principles” are not patentable did
not mean what we think it means (to paraphrase Inigo Montayo). 14
The confusion about the prohibition on abstract “principles,” which
Professor Risch shows was originally a rule of construction, 15 brings us
to the second reason to care about history: modern legal rules, and the
institutions that apply them, were formed in an earlier era and thus it
behooves us to understand the conceptual structure and the normative
policies that were built into this doctrine. This is a particularly pressing
concern in patentable subject matter doctrine, because, as Professor
Thomas Jefferson’s views on patents, quoting Noah Webster’s first American dictionary, and
detailing early English cases because “[t]he Constitution’s Patent Clause was written against the
‘backdrop’ of English patent practices . . . .”).
9. Risch, supra note 1, at 1282-1285.
10. Id. at 1281-82.
11. Id. at 1281.
12. See Bilski 130 S. Ct. at 3239 (Stevens, J., concurring) (rejecting business method
patents in part because this will “go beyond what the modern patent ‘statute was enacted to
protect’”) (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,
596 (1978) (“‘We would require a clear and certain signal from Congress before approving the
position of a litigant who . . . argues that the beachhead of privilege is wider, and the area of
public use narrower, than courts had previously thought.’”) (quoting Deepsouth Packing Co. v.
Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972)); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 216-17 (1980)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The broad question whether computer programs should be given
patent protection involves policy considerations that this Court is not authorized to address.”).
13. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961-62 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Dyk, J., concurring), rev’d,
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
14. THE PRINCESS BRIDE (20th Century Fox 1987).
15. See Risch, supra note 1, at 1296–97.
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Risch reminds us, “[t]he statutory definition of patentable subject matter
has not changed significantly since 1790.” 16 As he makes clear in his
analysis of the meaning of “principle” in early American patent
jurisprudence, much confusion in the law can arise when we are not
properly mindful of our origins. 17
What is most revealing, despite this confusion, is that early
Americans did not think that the patent system secured only
“technology” in the narrowest sense of this term, i.e., machines or a
particular physical transformation of material objects. 18 As they did in
so many other areas of patent law, 19 early Americans broke with
English precedent and permitted the patenting of processes. 20 These
upstart Americans even had the audacity to consider business methods
to be patentable processes! 21
Professor’s Risch’s discovery of early Americans’ favorable attitude
toward patenting new forms and types of inventions is consistent with
my own review of the historical record, in which I found that patents
were defined by courts as fundamental civil rights securing property
rights in inventions. 22 As such, Congress, the Patent Office, and courts
16. Id. at 1334.
17. Id. at 1300–04. As Professor Risch shows, early American judges were just as
confused about “principle” as we are today, because they cited to English patent cases, which
excluded processes as unpatentable “abstract principles.” The American patent system,
however, permitted patenting of processes, and it was common to refer to patents generally as
securing the “principle” of an invention. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Beers, 3 F. Cas. 617, 617–18
(C.C.D. Conn. 1852) (No. 1506) (instructing a jury that “in his specification, the patentee
explains the principle embodied in his machine, in other words, the novel characteristics or
inventive elements of the machine”) (emphasis added). These two senses of “principle”—the
valid sense of the invention and the invalid sense of an abstract idea—are invoked in tandem in
early American case law, and scholars and judges today have not done enough to ensure that
they have disentangled them. Cf. Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought
About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV.
953, 967–85 (2007) (discussing the different senses of “privilege,” as used in historical legal
documents in patent law, and similarly criticizing patent scholars today for failing to distinguish
between these different meanings).
18. See Risch, supra note 1, at 1327.
19. See Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical
Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 705 (2007) (discussing
how American judges extended constitutional protection to patentees against unauthorized uses
by the government in direct contravention to English patent practice); Adam Mossoff, A Simple
Conveyance Rule for Complex Innovation, 44 TULSA L. REV. 707, 713-14 (2009) (discussing
how American courts secured free alienation rights to patent-owners in direct contravention to
English patent practice).
20. See Risch, supra note 1, at 1297–99.
21. See id. at 1294–96, 1320–24.
22. See generally Mossoff, supra note 17 (describing how early American patent law
developed within the political and constitutional atmosphere of the first two hundred years of
the country’s history, and how patents were defined by courts as civil rights securing property
rights).
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treated patents liberally and expansively. 23 This was directly contrary to
the well-established legal rule governing the adjudication of monopoly
grants, like bridge franchises, which were construed narrowly against
franchisees in favor of the public given that these monopoly grants were
deemed to violate common law property rights. 24 Professor Risch’s
study further confirms that the judiciary’s favorable view of patents as
fundamental civil rights securing property rights in inventions was not
an anomaly. 25
Of course, there is an important limitation to Professor’s Risch’s
study of these early patents: what early American inventors thought was
patentable may not be a reliable source of information about early
American patent policy. For a significant period of his study (1793–
1836), patent applications were not examined and thus patents issued
regardless of their validity. 26 Many early American inventors had no
formal schooling or at least they lacked training in the field in which
they made their innovative discoveries, including many famous
patentees, such as Samuel Morse, Elias Howe, Jr., Charles Goodyear,
and Eli Whitney. 27 From 1793 to 1836, inventors were left free by the
registration system to patent whatever their hearts desired, even if they
were not exactly clear about what they had accomplished or were
unable to identify it clearly in the patent. 28 Moreover, patent attorneys
were striking out into undiscovered territory in a patent system that
departed in significant ways from English patent practice. 29 This not
only explains perhaps the confusing and sometimes incoherent patents
found by Professor Risch, 30 it suggests that court opinions concerning
these patents take on even greater importance, especially as indicators
of historical patent policy.
As courts today continue to decide patentable subject matter cases, 31

23. See id. at 998–1009.
24. See id. at 1000–01 (contrasting judicial treatment of property rights secured in patents
versus the judicial treatment of the monopoly franchise in the famous case of Charles River
Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837)).
25. As further evidence of this point, nineteenth-century judges repeatedly and explicitly
rejected legal claims against patentees based in the “public domain.” See Jordan v. Dobson, 13
F. Cas. 1092, 1095 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1870) (No. 7519)7,519) (Strong, Circuit Justice); see also
Mossoff, supra note 17, at 1007–08 (discussing this and other cases).
26. See Risch, supra note 1, at 1282.
27. See Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The
Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 175–76 n.66 (2011).
28. See Risch, supra note 1, at 1288-91.
29. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
30. See Risch, supra note 1, at 1287–94.
31. See, e.g., SmartGene v. Advanced Biological. Labs., 852 F. Supp. 2d 42, 55 (D.D.C.
2012) (applying Mayo v. Prometheus to invalidate a patented computer program as an “abstract
idea”).
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especially given the recent cert grant in the Myriad Genetics case, 32
judges and scholars will likely be grappling with Professor Risch’s
findings. But his study speaks more broadly about the patent system,
too. It cautions us against assuming that the American patent system
was born like Athena fully formed and complete from the English
system whence it came. The commonplace adage that “[t]he
Constitution’s Patent Clause was written against the ‘backdrop’ of
English patent practices” 33 obscures more than it illuminates the many
ways that early American patent law diverged from its English
predecessor. That these early American patent rules and institutions
continue to exist today makes it even more important that we
understand properly how and why they came to be.

32. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d
1303, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that isolated DNA sequences are patentable discoveries),
cert granted in part U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2012) (No. 12-398).
33. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3239 (2010) (Stevens, J. concurring) (quoting
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).
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